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Representative experimentA central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material
beneﬁt. Several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do
not lie maximally. These models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs, altru-
ism, efﬁciency concerns, or conditional cooperation. To provide an empirically-validated microfoundation for
these models, it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives. We measure the extent
of lying costs among a representative sample of the German population by calling them at home. In our setup,
participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport, misreporting cannot be detected, reputational con-
cerns are negligible and altruism, efﬁciency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role. Yet, we
ﬁnd that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs
are large and widespread. Further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of
communication.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Situationswith asymmetric information are ubiquitous.Most of eco-
nomic theory assumes that peoplemisreport their private information if
this is to their material beneﬁt; behavior is only determined by the
trade-off between ﬁnancial gains from misreporting and monetary
ﬁnes when misreporting is detected.1 In contrast, many recent models
in various domains of Public Economics (and in Economicsmore gener-
ally) rely on the assumption that people can experience a psychological
disutilitywhich holds themback frommisreporting, at least to some ex-
tent. These models invoke different underlying motives. Kartik et al.
(2014), for instance, assume that people face an intrinsic lying costion (SFB/TR 15), the European
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ion, Falkinger (1991) on public
goods, along with the seminal
. This is an open access article underand show that in this case the social planner can fully implement a
much wider range of social choice rules compared to the standard
Maskin (1977) case without lying costs (see, e.g., Matsushima (2008)
and Dutta and Sen (2011) for similar assumptions). Many studies
about incentive systems for doctors assume that doctors are altruistic
towards their patients and thus do not always state the proﬁt-
maximizing diagnosis but rather treat patients honestly (e.g., Ellis and
McGuire, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). The large literature
on “tax morale” (e.g., Lewis, 1982; Cowell, 1990; Andreoni et al., 1998;
Slemrod, 2007; Torgler, 2007) demonstrates that many tax payers mis-
report their income only a little bit or not at all. This literature is usually
agnostic about the exact underlying motives but some studies cite
efﬁciency concerns (e.g., Alm et al., 1992), patriotism (Konrad and
Qari, 2012), religiosity (Torgler, 2006), fairness (Bordignon, 1993), con-
ditional cooperation (Traxler, 2010) or honesty (Erard and Feinstein,
1994).
To further improve these models and to provide an empirically-
validated microfoundation, it is crucial to understand the relevance of
the different potential motives. Additionally, understanding these mo-
tives could inform the design of more psychologically-realistic policies,
e.g., in the area of tax enforcement, that have a higher potential of
being successful. In this paper, we focus on intrinsic lying costs and in-
vestigate how widespread and how large lying costs are. The ideal
data set to answer these questions would allow studying lying costs
for a representative sample of the population and in an environment
without the confounding effects of strategic interaction (including thethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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best evidence on lying costs comes from experiments conducted in
tightly controlled laboratory situations. A robust result is thatmany sub-
jects misreport their private information to their own advantage but
that a substantial share of subjects refrains from reporting the payoff-
maximizing type and that some are fully honest (e.g., Gneezy, 2005;
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi,
forthcoming; de Haan et al., 2011; Houser et al., 2012; Shalvi et al.,
2011; Wibral et al., 2012; Serra-Garcia et al., 2013). These studies are
a strong ﬁrst indicator that lying costs inﬂuence behavior. However,
lab experiments do not allow for inferences with respect to the preva-
lence of lying costs in the overall population since they have been con-
ducted almost exclusively with student samples (DellaVigna, 2009; Falk
andHeckman, 2009). Also, decisionmaking took place in an austere lab-
oratory environment which might trigger behavior representative only
of certain non-lab situations. It could thus be that there are systematic
differences between behavior of students in the laboratory and behavior
of non-student subjects outside the lab.
To circumvent these limitations, we measure how people report
their private information outside the laboratory by calling participants
on the phone at their home. Participants were drawn randomly from
the German population, yielding a representative sample. An incentiv-
ized experiment was embedded in the interview. The experimental
setup is related to the design of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(forthcoming) and is extremely simple: participants were asked to
toss a coin and report their type, i.e., either “heads” or “tails”. Reporting
tails yielded a payoff of 15 euros, which participants could choose to re-
ceive in cash or as an Amazon gift certiﬁcate, while reporting heads
yielded a payoff of zero. Participants thus had a clearmonetary incentive
to report tails regardless of their true type. It was obvious that the true
outcome was only known to the participants, as they tossed the coin
privately at home. In this setup, we cannot draw reliable conclusions
about the truthfulness of any individual report. But we can learn
about aggregate behavior by comparing the distribution of reports to
the true distribution of a fair coin (50% tails) and to the payoff-
maximizing distribution (100% tails). This indirect observation there-
fore allows us to study the behavior of subjects in a situation in which
private information is kept truly private and in which subjects do not
face any risk of detection.2 Moreover, the decision is non-strategic;
altruismdoes not play a role as themoney is not taken fromany individ-
ual person; and reputational concerns are minimized since the inter-
viewer is a stranger with whom no future interaction can be expected.
If all our participants were rational money maximizers, we would
expect that all of them reported tails. If behavior on the phone was sim-
ilar to previous comparable laboratory experiments (e.g., Houser et al.,
2012), we would expect about 75% of subjects reporting tails.
In contrast to these predictions, observed behavior does not statisti-
cally differ from everybody reporting honestly. If anything, participants
report the payoff maximizing outcome less often than expected under
truthful reporting. This latter effect, however, is small and disappears
in a second treatment in which participants were asked to report the
total number of tails in four consecutive coin tosses and received
5 euros times the number of reported tails. The resulting distribution2 In other studies concerning how people report their private information (e.g., Gneezy,
2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), the experimenter knows or will later know the
subject's true type (and the subject is aware of this) and can thus judge whether an indi-
vidual was honest or not. In our experiment, only the participant knows his or her private
information. Our setup is thus closer to situations inwhich information is truly private and
only known by the individual, while Gneezy's and Charness & Dufwenberg's setup ismore
representative of situations in which the private information is known by more than one
person, e.g., when ﬁling a joint tax declaration. These papers are also interested in the in-
teraction between sender and receiver, fromwhichwe abstract. (See, however, the recent
paper by Deck et al. (2013) who do not ﬁnd an additional effect of promises on coopera-
tion in single-blind and double-blind conditions.)of reports in the 4-Coin Treatment is indistinguishable from the distri-
bution under complete truth-telling. Moreover, while previous studies
(e.g., Dreber and Johannesson 2008) have found correlations between
individual characteristics, like gender, and truth-telling, we do not ﬁnd
any robust correlations between individual characteristics and
reporting behavior. This is not surprising if almost all participants report
truthfully. Reports are solely determined by chance, namely the coin
toss, which cannot be related to any individual characteristic. Our re-
sults thus show that lying costs are pervasive and are inﬂuencing
behavior regardless of gender, religious beliefs, education, or age.
We complement our telephone study with two additional control
treatments in the laboratory to better understand what shapes lying
costs, in particular the effect of the mode of communication. In both
lab treatments subjects reported the outcomes of four consecutive
coin tosses. Incentives were the same as in the 4-Coin Treatment in
the telephone study: 5 euros times the numbers of tails reported. In
the ﬁrst lab treatment, subjects had to report the outcome directly to
an interviewer via the phone, mirroring our telephone study. We
observe the same pattern of behavior as in previous lab experiment:
subjects lie much more than in the telephone study. In the second
control treatment, subjects reported the outcomes by clicking a number
between 0 and 4 on the computer screen as in most previous lab exper-
iments. We ﬁnd that subjects who enter their report by clicking report
slightly higher numbers but this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The difference to the telephone study persists: the average report in
each lab treatment is higher than in the telephone study. This shows
that the mode of communication does not systematically inﬂuence
reporting behavior strongly and is not driving the widespread truth-
telling in our telephone study. We also elicit beliefs about the behavior
of other participants and ﬁnd in all four treatments that participants
believe others to lie more than they actually do. Older participants
(correctly) believe that lying is less prevalent. In the lab, higher beliefs
are correlated with higher own reports. We ﬁnd no evidence that
being a student has a signiﬁcant impact on behavior, or that the per-
ceived time pressure on the telephone or the limited experience of the
survey participants with the abstract design of economics experiments
played a role.
Our paper adds to the nascent literature studying lying outside the
lab. Previous studies focused on particular groups: Bucciol and
Piovesan (2011) study a sample of children and ﬁnd that many of
them lie, unless they are reminded to be honest; Cohn et al. (2013)
study prisoners and ﬁnd that they become less honest when reminded
of their criminal identity; and Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) ask a
small sample of nuns to report the roll of a dice and ﬁnd signiﬁcant
downward lying. Studies looking at unethical behavior in less abstract
environments include Azar et al. (2013) who ﬁnd that the majority of
customers in a restaurant do not return excessive change. Similarly,
Bucciol et al. (2013) study free-riding in public transportation in Italy
and ﬁnd that 43% of passengers evade the fare. We add two features:
we study a representative sample andwe can investigate the underlying
motives by conducting additional lab experiments using the samewell-
deﬁned decision.
Taken together, our results strengthen the doubts that previous lab
experiments have cast on the assumption of zero lying costs: we ﬁnd
evidence for even higher lying costs in the telephone study. This
suggests that studying the theoretical implications of such costs (e.g.,
Kartik et al., 2007, 2014; Doerrenberg et al., 2013) is a promising re-
search avenue. At the same time, it is very likely that altruism, efﬁciency
concerns, etc. are also important factors in the decision to pay taxes or
how to treat patients, for example. Future researchwould need to inves-
tigate the relative importance of differentmotives that hold people back
from misreporting and the interactions between motives. Our results
also do not mean that lab experiments are uninformative about non-
laboratory settings. However, the difference in behavior between our
telephone study and our previous lab experiments rather shows how
malleable reporting behavior can be. This opens many new questions
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decision-making context. Intuitively, different norms might apply
whenmaking such a decision at home, representing a private and famil-
iar environment. Similarly, people could be more attentive to their own
moral rules, e.g., abstaining from lying when at home.3 Irrespective of
these differences between lab and ﬁeld, our study establishes that
lying costs aremore important than previously assumed and are strong-
ly inﬂuencing behavior across different decision environments.
In the next two sections, we present the design of the study and our
hypotheses. Section 4 contains the results. We discuss policy implica-
tions in Section 5.
2. Design
The computer-assisted telephone interviews were operated by the
Institute for Applied Social Sciences (infas), a private and well-known
German research institute. They were conducted between November
2010 and February 2011.4 The average interview lasted 20 min (stan-
dard deviation: 5.5 min). Telephone numbers were selected using a
random digit dialing technique: numbers were generated randomly
based on a data set of all potential telephone numbers in Germany.
Only landline numbers were used in this study, as 92.7% of German
households have a landline number (Destatis, 2012). The selection of
the participant within each household was also random: only the
member of the household whose birthday was the most recent among
all householdmembers was eligible to participate.We restricted partic-
ipation to those aged between 18 and 70 years at the time of the
interview.5
The surveywas split into two parts. The ﬁrst part of the questionnaire
consisted of questions relating to the participants' socio-demographic
background and their risk and trust preferences. Risk and trust prefer-
ences were measured by using subjective self-assessments, using the
general risk question of the GSOEP (“How do you consider yourself?
Are you in general a rather risk-loving person, or do you try to avoid
risks? Use a scale from 1, meaning that you are not at all willing to
take risks, to 7, meaning that you are absolutely willing to take risks.”
(Dohmen et al., 2011)) and the World Value Survey trust question
(“Generally speaking: Do you think one can trust other people, or that
one should rather be careful when dealingwith other people? Please in-
dicate your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning that one
should be careful when dealing with other people, and 7 meaning that
one can trust other people.”). After this part, the experiment described
below took place. After the experiment, participants were asked about
their political preferences, their current living and ﬁnancial situation,
their religious beliefs, and their attitudes towards opportunistic behav-
ior and everyday crime. At the very end of the interview, participants
were asked to state their belief about other participants' behavior in
the experiment.3 Previous research comparing behavior of student samples vs. non-students samples
and behavior in the lab vs. outside the lab has inmost cases shown little differences (with
a few notable exceptions, e.g., Stoop et al., 2012). The strong difference in behavior be-
tween our ﬁeld and lab studies suggests that truth-telling ismore context dependent than
other behaviors, like cooperation, altruistic behavior, or consumption choices (Abeler and
Marklein, 2010). For an overview and critical discussion, see Falk and Heckman (2009),
Camerer (2011), or Coppock and Green (2013).
4 The interviews were conducted in the infas telephone studio. Infas ensures a high
quality of interviews by supervising interviews randomly. Supervisors are present in the
telephone studio at all times and interviews can bemonitoredwithout the interviewer no-
ticing this.
5 The majority of non-participation was due to no one answering the phone or people
hanging up immediately after hearing that a market research ﬁrm called. Of the 738 peo-
ple who started the questionnaire of the 1-Coin Treatment at all and could condition their
participation on the content of questionnaire or experiment, 658 participants (89.1%)
completed the entire questionnaire and the experiment. Like in all telephone-based sur-
veys, the resulting sample is therefore representative for the part of the population who
was at home at the time of call and was willing to participate.Before the experiment started the participantwas reminded that the
resulting data would be anonymized, and that infas and the University
of Bonn guaranteed the correct payment. The interviewer then asked
the participant to take a coin and explained the rules of the experiment:
the taskwas to toss the coin and reportwhether heads or tails came up.6
If the participant reported heads, they received no payment. If the
participant reported tails, theywould receive 15 euros. Then, the partic-
ipant was asked to toss the coin and report the outcome. We will call
this treatment “1-Coin-Telephone.” 658 people participated in this
version of our experiment. A translation of the exact experimental
instructions can be found in Online Appendix A.
In a second treatment, 94 people were interviewed and participated
in the following variation of the experiment. Participants were asked to
take a coin, toss it four times, and report the number of times that tails
came up. For each timeparticipants reported tails they received 5 euros.
Thus, they could earn 0, 5, 10, 15, or 20 euros.Wewill call this treatment
“4-Coin-Telephone.” Payment in both treatments could be received
either in cash via regular mail or as an Amazon gift certiﬁcate code.
The alphanumeric 14-digit gift certiﬁcate code was transmitted via
email or directly on the phone at the end of the interview.
In order to further investigate what inﬂuences behavior in the
telephone study, in particular the mode of reporting, we additionally
conducted two versions of the 4-Coin Treatment in the laboratory. Sub-
jects were students of the University of Bonn studying different majors
except Economics. They were seated at a desk with a computer in sep-
arate room-high cubicles closed off by curtains. As the experiment
took only a fewminutes, it was run at the end of the sessions of a differ-
ent experiment (similar to Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, forthcoming).
In the preceding experiment subjects made abstract consumption or
labor supply choices which involved no private information and no in-
teraction with other subjects. When the experiment started, subjects
were asked to take a coin that was placed in their cubicle, toss it four
times, and report how often tails came up. For each time they reported
that tails came up they received 5 euros, i.e., up to 20 euros, just like in
4-Coin-Telephone. Their earnings were paid in cash directly after the
experiment.7
The only difference between the two lab treatments was how the
reporting was done. In the ﬁrst treatment, subjects had to state their re-
port directly to an interviewer via the phone, mirroring our telephone
study. After tossing the coin in their cubicle, they were asked to go
one-by-one to an adjacent room and pick up the telephone that we
had placed there. An interviewer on the other side of the line (whom
subjects never met directly) would then ask for their experimental ID
and the number of times the coin showed tails. We made sure that
other subjects could not hear the conversation. The starting times for
the coin tossing was staggered, such that subjects did not have to wait
between coin-tossing and reporting. 170 subjects participated in this
treatment which we will call “4-Coin-Lab-Tel.” This treatment serves
to replicate our telephone study as closely as possible in the laboratory.
In the second treatment, subjects reported their outcome by clicking a
number 0 to 4 on the computer screen, similar to previous lab experi-
ments. 180 subjects participated in the second treatment which we
will call “4-Coin-Lab-Click”. This treatment serves to investigate wheth-
er the mode of communication, i.e., clicking on a computer screen
versus reporting to a person via the telephone, inﬂuences reporting
behavior.6 A referee mentioned that some euro coins were reported to not be fair, in particular
when spinning the coin. We don't think this is a concern in our study since we asked par-
ticipants toﬂip or toss the coin. See Gelman andNolan (2002) for an explanation onwhy it
is extremely difﬁcult to bias a coin when ﬂipping it.
7 The instructions for the lab experiment can be found in Online Appendices B and C.
The experimentwas conductedusing ztree andORSEE (Fischbacher, 2007;Greiner, 2004).
10 Note that the sample size in 4-Coin-Telephone is substantially smaller than in 1-Coin-
Telephone (94 vs. 658) which reduces the statistical power of the tests. The non-signiﬁ-
cance is, however, mainly driven by the small effect size. If we (counterfactually) increase
the sample size to the usual sample sizes in these kindof experiments (e.g., 389 in the larg-
est treatment in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (forthcoming) or 251 in Houser et al.
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The standard economic prediction in our setup is straightforward:
depending on the treatment, people will report tails one or four times,
respectively. This is the payoff maximizing outcome as there are no ex-
ogenous costs linked to misreporting, no possibility of detection and no
ﬁnes. The setup is extremely simple and participants should have no
trouble identifying the payoff maximizing choice. Moreover, the setup
is highly anonymous, discouraging any reputational concerns because
of repeated interaction.
If, however, some participants incur a psychological cost or derive
direct disutility from falsely reporting their private information per se
we should expect both heads and tails to be reported in the experiment.
There are a few recent theoretical papers that assume such a cost. For
example, Kartik (2009) and Kartik et al. (2007) build on Crawford and
Sobel's (1982) cheap-talk model and derive predictions for the case
that some agents incur costs when misreporting their private informa-
tion (see also, e.g., Saran, 2011; Kartik et al., 2014). Assuming some de-
gree of heterogeneity in the incurred costs whenmisreporting, it is then
a question of the trade-off between psychological costs and monetary
beneﬁts of misreporting how many participants will report heads and
how many report tails.
Participants in 1-Coin-Telephone have to make a clear, binary choice
whether to lie or not; if lying costs are related to self-reputation or iden-
tity (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), lying in
such a setting could impact self-reputation or identity more and thus
make lying more costly. Participants in 4-Coin-Telephone can make a
ﬁner choice between being honest, exaggerating a little bit, or lying
maximally; this could render small lies compatible with a positive self-
reputation and thus enhance lying (Mazar et al., 2008). Such non-
maximal lying has already been shown to be important by Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (forthcoming).
In the telephone study, participants tossed the coin at their home. It
was thus obvious that the interviewer could not secretly observe the
true outcome of the coin toss.8 If some participants in our lab experi-
ments (erroneously) believed that the experimenter could observe the
true outcome and believed (again erroneously) that misreporting
would lead to some negative or unpleasant outcome, we would expect
more truth-telling in the laboratory.9
Regarding potential differences in reporting behavior according to
individual characteristics, we would expect that women are more hon-
est than men (as already shown by Dreber and Johannesson, 2008;
Houser et al., 2012). More religious participants would be expected to
be more honest, since religious priming leads to less lying and more
pro-social behavior (Mazar et al., 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan,
2007). Income could be positively correlated with honesty because of
the lower marginal utility of themonetary rewards or negatively corre-
lated because of reverse causality. A similarly ambiguous hypothesis can
be derived for education or the social environment, e.g., the size of the
community or family status. Along theories of endogenous social8 We cannot rule out the possibility that, e.g., family members were in the same room
with the participant. Behavior, however, does not differ between participants who live
alone and those who do not.
9 Actual anonymity is very high in the telephone study and clearly higher on the tele-
phone than in the lab. Perceived anonymity can and will vary from actual anonymity,
for example, participants might believe that someone calling their landlinewill also know
their name or address (whichwas not the case). However,wedon't see a clear reasonwhy
perceived anonymity should be higher in the lab than on the phone. The arguments above
even suggest that perceived anonymity in the lab is lower than actual anonymity, increas-
ing the telephone-lab difference in perceived anonymity. Either way, there is evidence
that the degree of anonymity does not affect behavior much anyway. Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (forthcoming) conduct a double-blind version of their experiment in which
both randomization and receiving payment are unobservable by the experimenter. Sub-
jects roll a die in private, take the payment out of an envelope, and then put the envelope
back into a boxwith other envelopes such that it is clear that payments and reports cannot
be assigned to any individual. Behavior does not change compared to the baseline treat-
ment, suggesting that (perception of) anonymity plays only a small role.norms (e.g., Traxler 2010; López-Pérez, 2010, 2012), we would expect
that higher beliefs about the reporting of other participants are correlat-
ed with own high reporting.
4. Results
4.1. Telephone study
Result 1. In 1-Coin-Telephone, the distribution of actual reports is very
close to the truthful distribution; participants report the payoff-maximizing
outcome slightly less often than expected if everyone reported truthfully. In
4-Coin-Telephone, the distribution of reports is indistinguishable from the
truthful distribution.
Fig. 1 illustrates aggregate behavior (the dashed line corresponds to
the expected distribution if every participant reported the true outcome
of the coin toss). 55.6% of participants report heads as the outcome of
the coin toss, yielding a payoff of zero, the remaining participants report
tails yielding a payoff of 15 euros. The payoff-maximizing outcome is
reported slightly less often than in 50% of the cases and although the dif-
ference is small in terms of effect size, it is signiﬁcant (Binomial test,
p = 0.004) Fig. 2 shows aggregate behavior in 4-Coin-Telephone.
Again, reporting behavior follows the expected distribution under com-
plete honesty very closely (the dashed line corresponds to the truthful
distribution). In fact, the distribution of reported outcomes is statis-
tically indistinguishable from the truthful distribution (Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test, p = 0.61; binomial tests of the expected against the
observed frequency, all ﬁve p N 0.13). In particular, and unlike in
1-Coin-Telephone where “too many” people report the payoff-
minimizing outcome, there is no signiﬁcant over-reporting of zero in
this treatment.10 Looking at behavior in both treatments we can there-
fore summarize that the payoff-maximizing outcome is reported by
much fewer participants than expected if no one incurred lying costs.
It is also reported less often than suggested by previous lab experimen-
tal studies, which ﬁnd some truth-telling but alsomany instances of the
payoff-maximizing report. Instead, it is close to the distribution that
would arise if every participant reported his or her type truthfully.11
Previous studies have shown that truth-telling correlateswith observ-
able characteristics, e.g. gender or religiosity (Dreber and Johannesson,
2008; Houser et al., 2012; Mazar et al., 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan,
2007). In contrast, if our conjecture that almost all participants report
truthfully is correct, an individual's reported outcomewill only be driven
by their random coin toss; if this is the case, reporting cannot be correlat-
ed with any individual characteristic, as these are orthogonal to the(2012) and assume the same shares of reports as in 4-Coin-Telephone, the distribution
continues to be indistinguishable from the truthful distribution. This changes only if we
increase the sample size beyond 500 (e.g., to 658 as in 1-Coin, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
p= 0.02).
11 We can only speculate about why some people obviously falsely claim to be of the
payoff-minimizing type and why this only happens in 1-Coin-Telephone. The design of
the experiment allows ruling out reputational concerns towards the interviewer as an im-
portant factor. Privacy concerns could drive this effect: reporting the type that gives zero
payoff makes it unnecessary to hand over one's address. The reason why we do not ob-
serve such an effect in 4-Coin-Telephone might be that reporting zero to avoid handing
over the addresswas less salient in this treatment. However,we ensured that privacy con-
cernswereminimized in both treatments by giving participants the opportunity to receive
the payment as a gift certiﬁcate code by email or directly via the phone. 17.2% of eligible
participants chose this last payment option which made it unnecessary to hand over any
additional contact details. Another possible explanation would be self-image concerns:
refraining from easily and safely earning 15 euros could be a strong signal to oneself that
one is not greedy and thereby ﬂattering for one's self-image. This interpretation would be
in linewith howUtikal and Fischbacher (2013) interpret theirﬁnding that nuns lie to their
monetary disadvantage. We will show more data below which strongly suggests that
downward lying is not widespread in our study.
Fig. 1. Aggregate behavior in 1-Coin-Telephone. Reporting heads yielded no payoff;
reporting tails yielded a payoff of 15 euros. The dashed line corresponds to the expected
distribution if every participant reported the true outcome of their coin toss.
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of (almost) complete honesty is supported.More speciﬁcally, we conduct
regression analyses for the two experiments in order to examinewhether
there are systematic effects of individual characteristics on reporting be-
havior. First, we regress the report only on clearly exogenous variables
such as age and gender, in a second step adding religious denomination.
We then include income, the size of the city the individual lives in, and
education dummies. Finally, we look at the effect of an individual's
religiousness (interacted with denomination), their risk and trust prefer-
ences, and their belief about the reporting behavior of other participants.
Result 2. There is no signiﬁcant correlation between reporting behavior
and any individual characteristic.
First, we look for potential group differences in terms of reporting
behavior in 1-Coin-Telephone by conducting Probit regressions of the
reported outcome on the respective characteristics (see Table 2 in On-
line Appendix E). No characteristic except for one's belief about others'
behavior is signiﬁcantly associated with reporting in the experiment:
participants who thinkmany other participants report tails dishonestly,
are less likely to report tails themselves. This belief is, however, not sig-
niﬁcant if we include it as the only explanatory variable (p = 0.15).
Note in particular that neither gender nor any religion-related variable
is signiﬁcantly correlated with reporting. Conducting the same regres-
sions as in Table 2 using OLS leaves the results unchanged. Next, weig. 2. Aggregate behavior in 4-Coin-Telephone. The payoff was 5 euros times the number
f tails reported. The dashed line corresponds to the expected distribution if every partic-
ant reported the true outcomes of their coin tosses.
12 It was obvious to the subjects that the experimenter on the phone was not the same
person as the experimenter in the lab, since the experimenter in the lab coordinated the
procedure of calling subjects one-by-one into the separate room with the phone.F
o
ipcheck whether these results also hold in 4-Coin-Telephone. We run
Ordered Logit regressions of the reported number of tails on the
same explanatory variables as before. Table 3 in the online appendix
illustrates the results from this estimation. Only the coefﬁcient for
trust is signiﬁcant. This effect is, however, not robust to the inclusion
of other explanatory variables. The effect is also not present in 1-Coin-
Telephone. In contrast to 1-Coin-Telephone, the belief coefﬁcient
shows no signiﬁcant association with reporting behavior in this treat-
ment and the point estimate has the opposite sign. We will discuss
the data on beliefs in more detail in Section 4.3.
Two further aspects of our analysis are worth noting. First, when
running OLS regressions using the same predictor variables as above,
we ﬁnd that only two of the 10 speciﬁcations have an adjusted R2
above 0 (below 0.004), all other adjusted R2 values are negative. More-
over, the resulting adjusted R2 tends to decrease in the number of in-
cluded variables. This again underlines our conclusion: the tested
predictor variables do not increase explained variance in the dependent
variable compared to pure chance. Second, we also test the correlations
between reported number and answers to the survey questions that we
did not include in the main speciﬁcations of Tables 2 and 3. These in-
clude a person's citizenship and country of birth, various personal char-
acteristics, a person's current job or educational situation and their
current or recent position in the professional hierarchy, a person's will-
ingness to tell white lies in different situations, a person's family status
and living situation (whether one lives with a partner and the number
of people belonging to the household), the frequency of church atten-
dance, a person's political preference, and the individual's tendency to
behave in an opportunistic way as well as the belief about others' will-
ingness to behave like that. Testing these variables as predictors in Prob-
it and Ordered Logit regressions in the two different data sets, akin to
Tables 2 and 3, we ﬁnd no robust association between any of them
and reporting behavior. In particular, this means that students and
non-students do not behave differently in our sample. This holds
when we consider current students or include former students as well
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests, all p N 0.409). It is thus not a student vs.
non-student difference, e.g., a difference in education, age, cognitive
skills, or socio-demographic background, which drives the difference
between our results and previous lab experiments. Summing up, the
overall picture is conﬁrmed: no individual characteristic, whether exog-
enous or endogenous, is systematically associated with reporting be-
havior suggesting that almost all participants in our study tell the
truth. It could still be that a subgroup of people, which we cannot iden-
tify with our background information, reports tails more often than ac-
tually true while another subgroup reports tails less often. This could
result in the two effects offsetting each other, which would result in a
similar picture of aggregate behavior. However, we consider this to
not be likely as our analysis shows that this is not the case for any of
the numerous subgroups that we can identify with our data. More im-
portantly, such an effect would further need to recreate the distinct dis-
tributions of Figs. 1 and 2 which is implausible.
4.2. Laboratory experiment
To further investigate the motivations underlying behavior in
the telephone study, we conducted two 4-Coin Treatments as labo-
ratory experiments. We will ﬁrst discuss the 4-Coin-Lab-Tel treat-
ment which keeps the mode of communication as in the telephone
study: subjects had to report their result over the phone directly
to an experimenter.12 Subsequently, we compare this treatment to
4-Coin-Lab-Click, in which subjects reported their number by clicking
Fig. 3.Aggregate behavior in the 4-Coin-Lab-Tel (upper panel) and 4-Coin-Lab-Click treat-
ments (lower panel). The payoff was 5 euros times the number of tails reported. The
dashed line corresponds to the expected distribution if every participant reported the
true outcomes of their coin tosses.
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ond comparison will allow us to disentangle the inﬂuence of the mode
of communication.13
Result 3. Subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel report substantially higher numbers
than subjects in 4-Coin-Telephone.
The upper panel of Fig. 3 shows aggregate behavior in 4-Coin-
Lab-Tel: most subjects refrain from reporting the maximal outcome,
forgoing on average 6.82 euros, quite a considerable amount com-
pared to the average hourly student wage in Germany of about
10 euros. At the same time, behavior is signiﬁcantly different from
the distribution expected under truthful reporting, the dashed line in
the ﬁgure (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, p b 0.001; binomial tests, all
ﬁve p b 0.009). This replicates previous ﬁndings in the lab: many sub-
jects lie but often not maximally. Reporting behavior also deviates
strongly from what we have observed in the telephone study: reports
are signiﬁcantly higher in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel than in 4-Coin-Telephone. In
Table 1, columns 1 and 2, we regress the reported number of tails on a
dummy for being in the lab, a dummy for 4-Coin-Lab-Click and controls
for age and gender. The lab dummy is highly signiﬁcant.14 We ﬁnd the
same result if we compare 4-Coin-Telephone and 4-Coin-Lab-Tel
using a two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (p b 0.001). These re-
sults demonstrates that our 4-coin randomization mechanism does
not drive the truthful behavior in 4-Coin-Telephone and that, by mov-
ing our telephone setup to the laboratory, we are able to strongly
change behavior (as we showed within the telephone study, this is
not driven by subjects being students per-se). How big is the additional
effect if we also change the mode of communication?
Result 4. Subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Click report slightly higher numbers than
subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel but this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Only the report of 4 occurs signiﬁcantly more often in 4-Coin-Lab-Click;
the reports of 0, 1, 2, and 3 are not different across treatments. Reports in
4-Coin-Lab-Click are signiﬁcantly higher than in 4-Coin-Telephone.
The lower panel of Fig. 3 shows aggregate behavior in 4-Coin-Lab-
Click. The distribution of reports is very similar to the one in 4-Coin-
Lab-Tel, the average report being only slightly higher (2.78 in Click vs.
2.64 in Tel). The overall distribution and the average report are not signif-
icantly different across the two treatments (two-sample Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test, p = 0.136; Ordered Logit in Table 1, columns 1 and 2,
both p N 0.096). The share of subjects reporting 0, 1, 2 or 3 are also
not signiﬁcantly different (tests of proportion, all p N 0.100). However,
subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Click report 4 signiﬁcantly more often
(p = 0.007).15 At the same time, behavior in 4-Coin-Lab-Click is
markedly different from 4-Coin-Telephone (two-sample Kolmogorov
Smirnov test, p b 0.001, Ordered Logit in Table 1, columns 1 and 2,
F-test, both p b 0.001). Overall, our data thus show that the mode of
communication does not have a strong effect on behavior and cannot
explain the difference between our telephone study and previous lab
experiments. This result is further conﬁrmed by Waubert De Puiseau
and Glöckner (2012) who also ﬁnd considerable truth-telling at home,13 We asked subjects to toss the coin four times instead of only once, to be able to repli-
cate non-maximal overreporting, one of the main results of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(forthcoming). SeeHouser et al. (2012) andBucciol and Piovesan (2011) for studieswith a
single coin toss; both also ﬁnd signiﬁcant overreporting.
14 We use Ordered Logit regressions in Table 1. All results, including the ones discussed
below, also obtain when we use OLS instead.
15 Two subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Click told us that they “accidentally clicked thewrongbut-
ton” and thus wanted to change their report; both subjects wanted to reduce their report,
one subject from 4 to 2 and the other from 4 to 0. The data shown here includes their ﬁnal
report as they received this report as payoff. Results stay very similar when we consider
their initial click.though not as extreme as in our data, using an online panel in which
participants answered questions at home by clicking on a computer
screen. Houser et al. (2012) conduct a 1-coin lab experiment and ﬁnd
similar levels of lying as in our lab experiments, replicating the other
side of our results.
One could think that one reason why behavior in the telephone
study differs is a perceived time pressure on the telephone which
might make lying more difﬁcult. However, we measure response
times in the laboratory and do not ﬁnd a correlation with the report
(Ordered Logit, p= 0.108).16 If anything, the report in the lab is higher
for short decision times. This mirrors results of Shalvi et al. (2012) who
impose exogenous time pressure in a similar lab experiment and who
ﬁnd that subjects become less honest under time pressure. Taken to-
gether, these results suggest that behavior in the telephone study is
not driven by perceived time pressure. We also ﬁnd no correlation of
the number of previous participations in other lab experiments with
reporting behavior in the lab (p = 0.578), suggesting that the limited
experience participants of the telephone study have with the abstract
design of economics experiments does not play a role. It rather seems
that different norms apply when making a reporting decision at home,16 We restrict the sample to 4-Coin-Lab-Click as the response time is measured very
noisily in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel where we cannot distinguish the actual decision time from the
walking to the next room, reporting, and coming back to the cubicle.
Table 1
Comparison of 4-Coin Treatments.
Dependent variable: Number of reported tails (0–4) Belief about other participants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if either lab treatment 1.370*** 1.079*** 1.242*** 1.260*** 0.074** −0.072
(0.225) (0.289) (0.246) (0.334) (0.035) (0.060)
1 if 4-Coin-Lab-Click 0.334* 0.307 0.230 0.204 0.098*** 0.100***
(0.201) (0.203) (0.204) (0.206) (0.031) (0.030)
1 if female −0.345* −0.371* −0.017
(0.183) (0.190) (0.028)
Age −0.013 0.001 −0.006***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.002)
Belief about other participants 2.114*** 2.115***
(0.356) (0.358)
N. Obs. 444 443 425 424 425 424
Notes: Ordered Logit Estimates (columns 1–4) and Tobit estimates (columns 5–6). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes all 4-Coin Treatments, i.e., 4-Coin-
Telephone, 4-Coin-Lab-Tel, and 4-Coin-Lab-Click. “Belief about other participants” is the belief of this participant about the share of participants who report to have tossed more tails
than they actually did and who report 4 tails (see text for details about the question). Signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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where other, more selﬁsh norms might be triggered.17
We showed above thatwomendonot report differently frommen in
the telephone study. As one can see from Table 1, women do report
lower numbers in the lab. This effect is only weakly signiﬁcant in
the sample of all three 4-Coin Treatments, i.e., also including 4-Coin-
Telephone which dilutes the effect, and becomes signiﬁcant if we re-
strict the sample to the two lab treatments (p = 0.027 and p = 0.046
in regressions akin to columns 2 and 4 of Table 1).4.3. Beliefs about other participants
Previous studies (e.g., López-Pérez, 2010; Diekmann et al. 2011)
have investigated the relationship of reporting behavior and the beliefs
about what other people report. Since our telephone and lab settings
generate strong differences in reporting behavior, we next examine
whether there is a similar difference in beliefs and whether this could
help explain the differences in behavior.
In all four treatments, we elicited beliefs about the reporting behav-
ior of the other participants.Wewillmainly focus on analyzing beliefs in
the 4-Coin Treatments as the outcome variable is richer andwe have ad-
ditional treatments. In the 4-Coin Treatments, subjects were asked two
questions regarding their beliefs about the behavior of other subjects in
their treatment (the question referred to 1000 participants in 4-Coin-
Telephone): “We are conducting this experiment also with 100 other
participants. How many of these 100 participants do you think report
tails more often than they actually tossed?” and “How many of these
X overreporting participants do you think report that they tossed tails
in each of the four coin tosses?”18 We will use the answers as direct
measure of the belief about the share of liars and about the share of
maximal liars. Using a very simple model, we can also combine the
two answers to back out the implied belief about the average report in
the population or the share of participants reporting the payoff-
maximizing outcome. The model assumes, similar to Kartik (2009)
andMazar et al. (2008), that participants expect others to face a psycho-
logical lying costwhich is increasing and convex in the size of the lie and17 Our lab andﬁeld experiments differ in a couple of other respects whichwe cannot dis-
entangle: subjects in the lab, for example, know that other subjects are in the same room,
even though they are separated by walls and curtains, while at least some telephone par-
ticipants will be alone; this might lead to different norms being triggered as suggested
above. Furthermore, the telephone survey cameas a surprise to participantswhile subjects
in the lab experiment signedup in advance andexpected to participate and to earnmoney.
Abeler (2013) explores the interaction of expectations and honesty and suggests that
higher expectations could lead to less honesty, in line with our results.
18 In 1-Coin-Telephone, we only asked one question: “Howmany of the participants re-
port tails although they tossed heads?”which might be heterogeneous between participants. Online Appendix
D describes the model and the belief measures in more detail.
Result 5. In all treatments, participants believe others to overreport more
than they actually do.
Fig. 4 compares average beliefswith average actual behavior for each
treatment. We take as variable of interest the share of participants who
report the payoff-maximizing outcome, i.e., 4 tails in the 4-Coin Treat-
ments and tails in 1-Coin-Telephone. Since we expected participants
to be unfamiliar with the true distribution of the sum of four coin tosses,
we didn't ask directly for their belief about this share. We are able to
calculate it, given the assumption of convex lying costs, from the two
questions for the 4-Coin Treatments: it is the share of liars who report
4 (question 2) plus the share of honest 4's (the probability of a true 4
times (1 — answer 1)). Since we do not observe whether an individual
overreports we cannot directly compare the two answers to actual be-
havior.19 We ﬁnd in all four treatments that participants believe that
others overreportmore than they actually do. The differences are highly
signiﬁcant (t-tests, all p b 0.001). The same results obtain when we
consider the average reported number as variable of interest.20
What shapes these beliefs?
Result 6. Older participants believe others to overreport less. Participants
expect more overreporting when participants can enter their report by
clicking on the screen.
In Table 1, columns 5 and 6, we regress the answer to the second
question on treatment dummies, a gender dummy and age (the table
only considers the 4-Coin Treatments). We ﬁnd that subjects in 4-Coin-
Lab-Click believe others to overreport more than subjects in 4-Coin-
Lab-Tel. Being in the laboratory seems to increase beliefs (column 5)
but this effect goes away oncewe control for age (column6). Participants
in the telephone study are on averagemuch older than the student sam-
ple in the lab and older participants expect others to overreport less. This
means that the beliefs of older participants in the telephone study are
closer to actual behavior than the beliefs of younger participants. The
same effect of age is present in 1-Coin-Telephone (p b 0.001). Using
the answer to the ﬁrst question, or the belief about the average report19 In Fig. 4 we assume that subjects in 1-Coin-Telephone expect all tossed tails to be re-
ported as tails.
20 If some participants care about the distribution of behavior among all participants, i.e.,
a kind of group reputation, the wrong belief could be a potential reason for why we ﬁnd
that some people lie to their monetary disadvantage in 1-Coin-Telephone: their behavior
could bemotivated by a desire to compensate for others' behaviorwhom they (falsely) be-
lieve to be lying. In 4-Coin-Telephone, such a strategy is not fruitful as too many zeros
would not help the group reputation.
Fig. 4. Share of maximal reports across treatments. The maximal report is 4 in the 4-Coin
Treatments and 1 in 1-Coin-Telephone. The dark bars depict actual behavior. The light-
colored bars depict the average belief of participants in each treatment about the behavior
of the other participants in their treatment.
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any of the results.
Result 7. In the lab, participants who believe that others report high
numbers also report higher numbers themselves.
We discussed above that there is no robust correlation between re-
ports and beliefs in the telephone study. In Table 1, columns 3 and 4,
we study the correlation of reports and beliefs for the 4-Coin Treatments
in lab and ﬁeld.We regress the reported number of coin tosses on treat-
ment dummies, controls for gender and age and on the answer to the
second belief question. We ﬁnd that participants who believe others
to report high numbers also report higher numbers themselves. If we
exclude 4-Coin-Telephone from the analysis, the coefﬁcient on the be-
lief variable becomes even bigger and stays signiﬁcant. One could inter-
pret thisﬁnding as yet another indication that almost all participants are
honest in the telephone study because, if somewere not, we should also
ﬁnd a correlation with beliefs in the telephone study (similar to the
gender effect we do not ﬁnd). Furthermore, since beliefs are on average
higher in 4-Coin-Tel-Click, the difference between the two lab treat-
ments –which is barely signiﬁcant in column 1 – becomes even smaller
once we control for beliefs. These results are again robust to the exact
belief measure we use.
The direction of causality between beliefs and behavior is obviously
unclear in our setting. On the one hand, it could be that a high belief in-
duces participants to also report higher numbers. This would be in line
with a notion that moral norms are endogenous to the beliefs people
hold about the behavior of their peers (see, e.g.,Traxler, 2010; López-
Pérez, 2010, 2012). Diekmann et al. (2011) provide causal evidence
that higher beliefs lead to higher reports. If this is the mechanism for
the correlation between beliefs and behavior, it is even more surprising
that participants, in particular in the telephone study, decided to refrain
from exploiting the opportunity to receive a considerable amount of
money when they believed that many others would do so. On the
other hand, the causality might run in the opposite direction if partici-
pants ex-post justify their own high report with a stated belief that
others also overreport.5. Conclusion
Using a representative sample of the German population we con-
ducted telephone interviews during which respondents participated
in an incentivized experiment. Depending on the treatment, theycould earn money by reporting tails as the outcome of one or four
coin tosses. We ﬁnd that almost all participants report their coin
toss(es) honestly: the distributions of reports are extremely close to
the true distribution of a fair coin toss or four coin tosses, respectively.
Moreover, reports are not correlated with any individual characteristic,
including gender which has been shown to predict honesty in previous
lab studies. We conducted additional laboratory experiments to study
the motives underlying the behavior on the phone. While reports are
generally higher in the lab than in the telephone study we ﬁnd little ev-
idence that themode of communication (reporting directly to someone
via the phone vs. clicking a number on a computer) inﬂuences behavior.
Being a student has also no effect.
Our results underline doubts about the generalizability of economic
models which assume that people always lie maximally when it is
ﬁnancially beneﬁcial. Apparently, people do not only care for the
trade-off between ﬁnancial gains from misreporting and the monetary
ﬁnes when misreporting is detected (cf. Becker, 1968). Our results in-
stead support models like Erard and Feinstein (1994), Kartik et al.
(2014) or Doerrenberg et al. (2013) which assume that many people
do not lie or do not lie maximally; intrinsic lying costs could be a poten-
tial microfoundation for these and similar models. The effect of patriot-
ism and religiosity on tax morale (Konrad and Qari, 2012; Torgler,
2006), for example, could also work through an increased lying cost.
The strong differences we ﬁnd between telephone and lab environ-
ment suggest that lying costs are stronger in our setting outside the lab.
It seems that different norms apply when reporting private information
at home. Similarly, it might be that the familiar and intimate environ-
ment of one's own home reinforces one's personal identity and renders
personal moral standards more salient. This is in line with recent evi-
dence by Cohn et al .(2013) who conduct a similar experiment with
prisoners. They ﬁnd that priming prisoners with their criminal identity
reduces honesty. Lab experiments, in turn, could bemore representative
of decisions for which people take on a particular role or identity in ad-
dition to their private identity.
At the same time, this study does not imply that everybody always
reports their private information truthfully. The level of lying costs
seems rather to be inﬂuenced by the context in which people are
asked to report their type (see also Mazar and Ariely, 2006; Mazar
et al., 2008). The difference in behavior on the phone and in the lab
shows how malleable reporting behavior can be. Our results therefore
point to important policy implications: institutions, e.g., tax authorities,
could make use of the context dependence of reporting behavior when
designing decision-making environments. As we ﬁnd strong evidence
for widespread lying costs, appropriate mechanisms might be much
less complex than those resulting when assuming that agents have no
qualms about lying. It might be possible to change reporting behavior
in simple and low-cost ways in the spirit of libertarian paternalism
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Further research is necessary to uncover
what the crucial aspects of the decision-making environment are that
induce truth-telling.Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.005.References
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